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POPULAR SUPPORT FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS AND PARTNER
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS: EVIDENCE FROM AN UNEXPECTED
ELECTION OUTCOME
TOM COUPÉ and OLEKSANDR SHEPOTYLO ∗
Using quasi-experimental data from a survey that was conducted immediately before
and after the November 2016 presidential election, we analyze how the election of
Donald Trump affected the willingness of Europeans to sign a trade and investment
agreement with the United States. We find that the election outcome lead to an immediate
and sizable negative effect on Europeans’ image of the United States. But we do not find
that, at the same time, there was a negative reaction in the willingness of Europeans to
sign an agreement with the United States. (JEL F14, F55, C26, F50)
I. INTRODUCTION
There is already a substantial body of aca-
demic literature on the determinants of indi-
viduals’ trade policy preferences (see Kuo and
Naoi 2015 for an overview). In this paper, we
contribute to this literature by using a quasi-
experimental methodology to investigate how the
election of Donald Trump as president of the
United States affected the trade policy prefer-
ences of Europeans.
Knowing why some people are in favor of
free trade with a given partner while others are
against is important because public opinion can
influence policy makers and hence can affect the
extent of trade liberalization. Indeed, trade agree-
ments have been a salient issue in many elections
(e.g., whether or not to renegotiate NAFTA was a
contentious issue during the 2016 U.S. election)
and some countries even have organized refer-
enda about trade agreements (e.g., in 2016, there
were the Brexit referendum in the United King-
dom and the Dutch referendum about the associa-
tion agreement between the European Union and
the Ukraine). Knowledge about the reasons why
people oppose or support specific trade agree-
ments can help policy makers interested in trade
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liberalization to convince those against trade lib-
eralization to change their view, and vice versa,
and help those against liberalization to find out
what needs to be done to increase the share
of the population that opposes a specific free
trade agreement.
Initially, the literature on individuals’ trade
policy preferences investigated whether indi-
viduals’ attitudes toward international trade
were driven by economic characteristics such as
industry of employment or factor endowment
profile (typically measured by years of educa-
tion). On the production side, research driven
by testing predictions of the Heckscher–Ohlin
model found that individuals with relatively
more abundant resources favor free trade (Jäkel
and Smolka 2017; Mayda and Rodrik 2005).
Evidence on the consumer side of free trade
comes, for example, from Baker (2005), who
found that consumers of exported products are
less supportive of free trade.
While economic factors do tend to corre-
late with individuals’ trade policy preferences,
many noneconomic factors have been found to
correlate as well.1 Mansfield and Mutz (2009)
1. Note further that these noneconomic views are often
argued to be at least as important as economic factors (see
e.g., Mansfield and Mutz 2009 or Spilker, Bernauer, and
Umaña 2018).
ABBREVIATIONS
EU: European Union
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
WTO: World Trade Organization
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find, for example, that there is less support for
free trade among those “who believe the United
States should take an isolationist stance on inter-
national affairs more generally or those who feel
that members of other ethnic and racial groups are
less praiseworthy than their own racial or ethnic
group.”
Recently, a number of papers have focused
on people’s use of “treaty partner heuristics”
(Steiner 2018) when deciding whether or not to
support the signing of a trade agreement with a
specific partner. These papers argue that when
people are asked whether they support a trade
agreement with a particular partner, they rely on
their general feelings toward that potential trade
partner. Steiner (2018), for example, finds that
European respondents in countries which have
a positive attitude toward the United States are
more likely to support the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement
with the United States. Similarly, Jedinger and
Schoen (2018) and Jungherr et al. (2018) find
that Germans who are more supportive of the
United States are more likely to support the
TTIP agreement with that country. More gener-
ally, Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña (2018) argue
that2,3:
Recent research on public support for international
trade agreements (Gray and Hicks, 2014; Hearn,
2013; Spilker et al., 2016; Umaña et al. 2015) shows
that not only specific characteristics of countries, in a
stylized sense, matter for trade preferences, but also
the general image of these countries. In view of infor-
mational constraints, individuals tend to rely on the
name of specific countries as heuristics and attach
positive or negative images to them. For example,
due to historical animosity between the two countries,
PTAs including Costa Rica are likely to be viewed
less favourably by Nicaraguans than PTAs with other
countries, and vice versa. Similarly, due to military
and security rivalries PTAs including China could be
perceived more negatively in Vietnam compared to
PTAs with other large economies.
In this paper, we analyze a natural experiment
in which the potential trade partner’s characteris-
tics were unexpectedly changed.4 In November
2. Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) focus on the demand
for protection rather than on the demand for free trade but
similarly find that “changing the name of the country to which
production is outsourced, from France to Cambodia, increases
the demand for import protection by 6 percentage points.”
3. There is also a literature on opinion and trade (rather
than trade policy preferences). Examples include Disdier and
Mayer (2007), Micheals and Zhi (2010), and Rose (2019)
4. While the literature on the determinants of individuals’
trade policy preferences is large, the vast majority of the
2016, Donald Trump surprised most observers
by winning the United States presidential elec-
tion. As a consequence, most participants in the
November 3–14, 2016 Eurobarometer survey
who were asked about their opinions on a trade
agreement with the United States just before the
election had Hillary Clinton in mind as presi-
dent and as the trade partner. On the other hand,
those who were asked after the election consid-
ered a trade agreement with the elected President
Donald Trump. In this paper, we investigate how
this change in “treaty partner heuristics” affected
the willingness of Europeans to have a trade and
investment agreement with the United States.
An analysis of almost 200,000 Europeans
from 28 European Union (EU) states reveals that
Trump’s election did not immediately decrease
support of Europeans for a free trade and invest-
ment treaty with the United States. This is sur-
prising, given that most Europeans preferred
Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump, which is
illustrated by the fact that we also find that
Trump’s election had an immediate and sizeable
negative impact on the perception of the United
States in Europe, increasing the share of Euro-
peans who perceived the United States as going
in the wrong direction by roughly 10 percent-
age points. Given the literature cited above, one
would thus expect this substantial decrease in the
image of the United States to lead to a noticeable
decrease in support for a trade agreement with
the country, but the overall analysis does not sup-
port this.
We find that the reason for the lack of a sub-
stantial decrease in support is twofold. First, we
find the impact of a country’s image to be fairly
limited: a person who thinks the United States is
going in the right direction is only about 10–20
percentage points more likely to be supportive of
a trade and investment agreement with the United
States than a person who either thinks the United
States is going in the wrong direction or a person
who is undecided about the direction in which the
country is going. Second, we find that the elec-
tion of Trump mainly shifted undecided people
toward a negative view rather than shifting people
studies in this literature had limited success in addressing
possible endogeneity issues. Exceptions are a number of
recent studies that provide experimental evidence. Spilker,
Bernauer, and Umaña (2018), for example, use a conjoint
choice experiment in which participants are shown potential
trade agreements with various characteristics and are asked
to express their degrees of support for these agreements.
While such experiments use hypothetical scenarios, in our
paper we analyze a natural experiment and real-life changes
in characteristics.
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with a positive view to a negative view. Given that
undecided people are about as likely to support a
trade agreement with the United States as people
who think the country is going in the wrong direc-
tion, such a shift had little influence on the overall
share of people in support of a trade agreement.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. We first describe the methodology and
the data we use in this paper. This is followed
by an analysis of how of the unexpected election
of Trump affected Europeans’ opinions about a
trade and investment agreement with the United
States. We then analyze how the election affected
how the United States is perceived in Europe
and check whether changes in the image of the
United States can explain the effect of the election
outcome. Finally, we check heterogeneity in the
impact of the election outcome by analyzing data
from individual EU countries.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To assess the causal impact of a coun-
try’s image on the willingness to sign a trade
agreement with that country, one could do an
experiment in which half of the interviewees are
presented with a potential partner country that
had elected a president most of the respondents
would support, while the other half are presented
with a potential partner country that had elected
a president whom few of the respondents would
support. By randomizing the interviewees over
the two scenarios, one could get an unbiased
estimate of the impact of the difference in these
two scenarios on people’s trade agreement pref-
erences. This is similar to what has been done
in conjoint choice experiments (see e.g., Spilker,
Bernauer, and Umaña 2018).5
Rather than analyzing a hypothetical situ-
ation such as the above, however, we use a
natural experiment or an “unexpected event dur-
ing survey design” (see Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno,
and Hernández 2020 for other examples of this
approach), where an unexpected election out-
come happened while a survey was conducted.
As far as we know, we are the first to apply this
methodology to identify the causal determinants
of trade policy preferences.
5. Spilker, Bernauer, and Umaña (2018) present several
scenarios to the same respondent. In our case, the scenarios
are presented to different respondents, but as we will argue
below, the surprise election lead to a quasi-random allocation
of respondents to scenarios, making the average respondent
in both scenarios similar.
The data we use comes from seven Euro-
barometer surveys implemented between
November 2014 and November 2017, in which
about 200,000 Europeans were asked about their
support for a trade and investment agreement
with the United States.6
Importantly, the November 2016 Eurobarom-
eter Survey, took place between November 3 and
November 14, 2016. About 35.4% of the respon-
dents were interviewed just before the election on
November 8, 2016, while the remaining 64.5%
were interviewed just after the election result
became known.
When asked about their opinion on a trade
and investment agreement with the United States,
most of those interviewed before the election
expected the trade agreement to be negotiated and
possibly implemented under a Clinton admin-
istration. While the chance of a Trump presi-
dency had been increasing throughout the elec-
toral campaign, the betting odds favored a clear
Clinton win. For example, the FiveThirtyEight
website’s polls-only model showed a decrease
in Clinton’s chances to win from about 90%
3weeks before the election, to about 75% a
week before the election (Guilford 2016). Paddy
Power, a bookmaker, even paid off bets before the
elections took place, being sure Clinton would
win (Tuttle 2016). As the results of the election
started to come in during the election night, the
odds reversed, however. For example, during the
election night, Ladbrokes’ odds moved quickly
from a 76% Clinton win to an 85% Trump win,
while PredictIt decreased Clinton’s chances from
about 80% to about 5% (Tennery 2016).
Not only did most people expect Clinton
to win but most Europeans were also favor-
ably inclined toward a Clinton presidency (see
Table 1). A YouGov Poll (2016) found, for
example, that about three-quarters of respon-
dents in the Nordic countries and Germany,
and more than 60% in France and the United
Kingdom would vote for Hillary Clinton. A
Gallup survey of respondents in 15 European
countries similarly found, on average, 69%
supporting Clinton.
An election outcome allows people to infer
two things about the potential trade partner. Not
only does the election outcome provide informa-
tion about who would be the next president of
6. We use the November 2014, May 2015, November
2015, May 2016, November 2016, May 2017 and November
2017 surveys. We focus on the respondents from the 28 EU
countries because respondents in the candidate countries were
not asked all questions used in our analysis.
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TABLE 1
Share of Voters in Various European Countries
Supporting a Specific Candidate for the U.S.
Presidential Elections
Gallup Poll (August/
September 2016)
YouGov Poll
(October 2016)
Clinton Trump DK Clinton Trump DK
Austria 78 9 13
Finland 86 7 7 78 9 13
France 72 10 18 64 11 25
Germany 77 8 15 72 9 19
Ireland 74 12 14
Italy 73 16 11
Netherlands 77 8 15
Portugal 85 5 10
Spain 70 4 26
Sweden 82 7 11 74 10 16
United Kingdom 64 15 21 65 11 24
Latvia 46 22 32
Macedonia 48 20 32
Slovenia 52 22 26
Bulgaria 51 26 23
Denmark 81 4 15
Average 69.0 12.7 18.2 72.3 9.0 18.7
The numbers give the share of voters supporting a given pres-
idential candidate or being undecided. Based on Duvall (2016) and
Smith (2016).
the potential trade partner country, but it also pro-
vides information about the political preferences
of the trade partner country’s population. Hence,
in our case, many of those interviewed before the
election would have assumed that the trade part-
ner country would be led by a president whom
they prefer to be the elected president of that
country. In addition, they assumed that a big part
of the population of the trade partner had similar
political preferences and would elect that candi-
date too.
In contrast, those interviewed after the elec-
tion expected the trade agreement to be negoti-
ated and possibly implemented under the Trump
administration. For very few Europeans, about
10%, according to the above-mentioned surveys,
Trump was the preferred candidate.
Moreover, what to expect under a Trump
administration was very different from what to
expect under a Clinton administration. Trump’s
campaign platform was indeed clearly differ-
ent from Clinton’s campaign platform, each rep-
resenting a different kind of United States. In
terms of the economy, Trump focused on reduc-
ing taxes and regulations, while Clinton promised
to increase taxes on the rich and spending more
on job training (BBC 2016). In terms of inter-
national policy (Plett Usher 2016), while Clin-
ton saw the United States as a provider of global
order, Trump focused on “America First.” As
candidate for the Democratic party, Clinton was
also much more closely aligned with President
Obama, while Trump aimed to repeal some of
the Obama administration’s policies (e.g., Oba-
macare [Salisbury 2016]).
As for trade, Trump’s proposal was to reverse
many years of trade liberalization. He planned
to “rip up” existing trade agreements, renegoti-
ate NAFTA, and impose 45% tariff on imports
from China. He also suggested he might with-
draw from the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Noland et al. 2016). Withdrawal from the WTO
would be particularly damaging for small open
economies, that rely on the WTO and its mecha-
nism of reciprocity to protect themselves against
high tariff rates set by large countries.7
Trump’s view on trade was formed long
before 2016. He had consistently advocated
for protectionist policies against Japan since
1987 (Schlesinger 2018). Clinton, on the other
hand, had the reputation of a cautious free trade
supporter—she backed the creation of NAFTA,
negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
agreement as the secretary of state for Presi-
dent Obama and voted in favor of free trade
agreements with Chile, Singapore, Australia,
Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman. At the same
time, during her election campaign she reversed
her opinion about the TPP (Calmes 2016). It
would be fair to depict Clinton as a skeptical
and reluctant supporter of the status quo in trade
policy and Trump as an unambiguous and sharp
opponent of the status quo, pushing toward
more protectionist and isolationist trade policy
(Noland et al. 2016).
In short, for many of those asked after the
election, the potential trade and investment agree-
ment partner country would be led by a president
whom they preferred not to be the president of
that country. In addition, as the election revealed,
the trade and investment partner had a large part
of the population that did not share the same polit-
ical preferences as those interviewed after the
election.8
So far, we have shown that interviewees
before and after the election were likely to have
7. Large economies can manipulate terms of trade and
would prefer to set a positive tariff for their imports in a non-
cooperative global trade equilibrium without the WTOmech-
anisms in place (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Ossa (2014) has
shown that for large countries in noncooperative global trade
equilibrium the optimal tariffs are around 60%.
8. Note that we assume that respondents correctly antic-
ipated the impact of a Clinton presidency and hence that a
Clinton election would have no sudden impact on our vari-
ables of interest.
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TABLE 2
Differences between the Control and the Treatment Group in the Means of Selected Explanatory
Variables
Average
Age
%
Male
% Highly
Educated
% Still
Studying
%Middle
Class
% Retired/
unable to
Work
% Skilled
Manual
Worker % Rural
November 8 48.98 46.86 26.91 9.63 63.19 30.05 9.18 29.69
November 9 48.2 48.45 28.41 9.71 63.16 27.7 8.97 28.53
p value of t-test .34 .45 .39 .95 .99 .19 .87 .55
November 3–8 49.05 48.11 28.37 9.12 62.92 29.84 8.83 29.14
November 9–14 47.94 48.25 29.33 8.47 63.26 26.74 8.99 33.54
p value of t-test .01 .9 .3 .34 .73 0 .78 0
The numbers in the table are percentages except for the average age. p values are between 0 and 1. Survey weights to make
the sample representative of the EU28 are used. Highly educated means more than 20 years of education. p values are for a t-test
of difference in means between groups. n = 6,312 (November 8/9) and 27,693 (November 3–8vs November 9–14).
had substantially different images of the United
States in mind. Hence, by comparing answers on
questions related to the United States from those
asked before the election to those asked after,
we can estimate the impact of the change in the
potential trade partner’s characteristics.
Before presenting the results of such an anal-
ysis, it is important to notice that unlike a lab
experiment in which the researcher can random-
ize respondents over the test and control groups,
the natural experiment we analyze here does
not guarantee randomization. If allocation of the
respondents into the two scenarios is nonrandom,
differences in the outcomes of the two scenar-
ios can no longer be considered as unbiased esti-
mates of the impact of these differences in the
scenarios. In our case, if the background charac-
teristics of respondents who were asked before
the election are different from the characteris-
tics of those interviewed after the election, then
the difference in the responses between these two
groups can no longer be considered a causal esti-
mate of the change in the potential trade part-
ner’s characteristics.
One argument supporting the idea that the
election date lead to a random allocation of
respondents into the two scenarios is that self-
selection is unlikely in this case: people are
indeed unlikely to schedule their interviews in
function of elections abroad. Moreover, given
that the election of Trump was a surprise,
it is even more unlikely that they scheduled
their interview in function of the outcome of
the election.
However, one cannot exclude the possibility
that some determinants of the choice of interview
date could be related to the views of the respon-
dents about the United States. If, for example,
optimists are more likely to be later respondents,
after the election one would see a decrease in the
share of respondents who think that the United
States is going in the wrong direction.
To provide an idea of the magnitude of the
difference between the background characteris-
tics of respondents interviewed before the elec-
tion and those interviewed after the election,
we first compare the means of various variables
reflecting both background characteristics and
opinions, variables which we will later use as
control variables in a regression analysis. Table 2
shows the differences in background charac-
teristics between respondents interviewed (just)
before and after the election in terms of aver-
age age, the shares of males, of highly educated
individuals, of students, of respondents having
no difficulties paying bills, of retirees, of skilled
manual workers, and of respondents living in
rural areas or villages. Table 3 focuses on dif-
ferences in opinions, more specifically on the
shares of people with “left” political views, peo-
ple who have trust in the legal system, people
who have a positive or very positive image of free
trade and people who say they are informed about
European matters. For comparison, it also shows
the difference in the share of respondents who
support a free trade and investment agreement
with the United States and the share of respon-
dents who think the United States is going in
the wrong direction. The latter two variables will
be used later as dependent variables in a regres-
sion analysis.
Tables 2 and 3 show that only one of the 12 dif-
ferences in control variables between November
8 andNovember 9 is significant at the 10% signif-
icance level. When comparing the period before
and after the election, differences in control
6 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 3
Differences Between the Control and the Treatment Group in the Means of the Explanatory and the
Dependent Variables
%
Left
%
Trust
% Positive
About Free
Trade
% Informed
About EU
% Supports
Agreement with
United States
% United States
Wrong Direction
November 8 26.36 48.39 66.52 37.55 46.94 46.51
November 9 26.31 52.33 67.63 36.53 50.3 60.44
p value of t-test .98 .06 .57 .61 .11 0
November 3–8 26.27 51.56 67.99 37.31 50.28 48.95
November 9–14 26.96 50.92 68.12 38.35 54.93 57.8
p value of t-test .46 .55 .89 .31 0 0
The numbers in the table are percentages. p values are between 0 and 1. Survey weights to make the sample representative
of the EU28 are used. p values are for a t-test of difference in means between groups. n = 6,312 (November 8/9) and 27,693
(November 3–8 vs November 9–14).
variables remain relatively small but three out of
12 are now significant (which is not surprising
given the increased size of the sample). Table 3
also shows that the differences before and after
the election in the outcome variables tend to be
larger than the difference in the control vari-
ables, especially so for the change in the share of
respondents who think the United States is going
in the wrong direction.9
Note that if we run a regression of a dummy
variable that reflects being interviewed after the
elections, on the variables of Tables 2 and 3 we
obtain some significant coefficients (and joint
significance of all coefficients), but an R2 of less
than 1%.
There is one variable, however, that is clearly
distributed differently before and after the elec-
tion. First, given that the start date of the survey
varied slightly from one country to another, the
share of interviews held before and after the elec-
tion varies by country and hence the country com-
positions of the two groups differ (see Table 4).10
We control for this difference by including coun-
try dummies in our regression analysis.
If we run a regression of a dummy, which
reflects being interviewed after the elections, on
the variables of Tables 2 and b and country dum-
mies, we get an R2 of about 7%.
9. The statistics in this and other tables are weighted
sample statistics, where weights are used to make the sample
representative of the population of EU. In the Appendix S1,
we have tables with unweighted statistics where each country
has approximately the same number of observations. Overall,
the results are similar to those presented in the text.
10. The Eurobarometer survey has separate surveys for
East and West Germany and for Northern Ireland. Hence,
while there are 28 member states, there are 30 different
entities identified as “countries” in the dataset. In this paper,
we aggregate the data to 28 countries.
TABLE 4
Distribution of Observations over Countries
Before and After the November 8 Elections
Before Elections After Elections
France 4.77 2.97
Belgium 3.77 3.64
Netherlands 4.19 3.34
Germany 8.35 3.96
Italy 4.39 3.29
Luxembourg 2.26 1.57
Denmark 3.96 3.45
Ireland 1.78 4.65
Great Britain 3.15 5.78
Greece 4.38 3.23
Spain 2.78 4.13
Portugal 2.99 4.02
Finland 3.95 3.59
Sweden 3.42 3.87
Austria 4.06 3.5
Cyprus 2.55 1.39
Czech Republic 3.16 3.88
Estonia 4.44 3.19
Hungary 2.61 4.16
Latvia 3.19 3.87
Lithuania 3.9 3.5
Malta 2.29 1.62
Poland 3.84 3.58
Slovakia 1.56 4.78
Slovenia 3.43 3.73
Bulgaria 6.43 2.13
Romania 1.07 5.04
Croatia 3.33 4.1
The numbers in this table are the shares of various coun-
tries in the sample of respondents interviewed before the
elections and in the sample of respondents interviewed after
the elections.
As a final note of caution, our results could be
influenced by other events that happened in the
period under consideration. For this reason, we
present the results when comparing respondents
who were interviewed the day before the election
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TABLE 5
Evolution of the Views of EU Respondents on a Free Trade and Investment Agreement with the
United States
November
2014
May
2015
November
2015
May
2016
November,
3–8, 2016
November
8, 2016
November
9, 2016
November,
9–14,
2016
May
2017
November
2017
For 58.3 56.33 52.94 50.94 50.28 46.94 50.3 54.93 54.26 56.42
Against 25.18 28.15 31.67 34.29 35.77 38.89 35.09 32.15 31.79 30.76
Don’t know 16.53 15.52 15.4 14.77 13.95 14.16 14.61 12.92 13.95 12.82
The numbers in the table are percentages. Survey weights to make the sample representative of the EU28 are used.
(November 8, 2016) to respondents who were
interviewed the day after the election (Novem-
ber 9, 2016), in addition to the results of a com-
parison of respondents who were interviewed
between November 3 and November 8 to those
interviewed between November 9 and November
14. Given the shortness of the time interval and
the importance of the event, the relative influence
of other events should be small.
III. THE TRUMP ELECTION AND THE OPINION OF
EUROPEANS ON A TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES
We now turn to the impact of the Trump elec-
tion on the trade policy preferences of Euro-
peans. We measure trade policy preferences of
the Europeans using the following question from
the Eurobarometer survey: “Are you in favour of
or against a free trade and investment agreement
between the EU and the USA?” The possible
answers were “for”, “against” and “don’t know.”
This question was first asked in November 2014
and has been asked every 6 months since. Table 5
gives the evolution over time of the opinion on
this question.
As one can see from Table 5, the share of
respondents against the agreement increased
from November 2014 onwards to reach a peak
just before the election followed by a decrease
which started immediately after the election.
Similarly, the share of people in favor of an
agreement increased immediately after the elec-
tion. More specifically, the share of people who
are in favor of a free trade and investment agree-
ment with the United States increased by about
3 percentage points between November 8, and
November 9, 2016. An even somewhat bigger
increase is obtained if we compare the period
November 9, 2016 to the period November
9–14, 2016.
This obviously is a surprising result: as
explained earlier, European respondents were
much more supportive of Hillary Clinton than
of Donald Trump. Hence, consistent with the
“trade partner heuristic” literature, one would
expect a lower share of people to support a trade
and investment agreement with the United States
after the election, rather than a higher share.
We therefore first check whether differences
in background variables (those described in
Tables 2, 3 and 4) between respondents before
and after the election can explain this apparent
positive effect of the Trump election on the share
of respondents in favor of a trade agreement with
the United States. Column I of Table 6 presents
the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression with a dummy as dependent variable
that is one for respondents in favor of a trade and
investment agreement with the United States, and
zero otherwise. As our main explanatory variable
of interest, we use a dummy variable that is one
for respondents who were interviewed after the
election and zero otherwise. We use two sets of
control variables. The first set (columns I, III, V,
and VI) only includes variables that are available
in every wave between November 2014 and
November 2017 and that are clearly exogenous
because to find the total impact of the election,
we should avoid including variables that could
be affected by the election outcome itself. This
first set includes age in years, country dummies,
educational level (reflected by dummies for
seven educational categories that depend on the
age when one finished formal education), pro-
fession (reflected by dummies for various jobs),
financial situation (dummies reflecting how
often the respondent had difficulties paying bills
last year), dummies for the type of community
(rural/urban) and the gender of the respondent
(a full list of variables and their descriptions
can be found in the Appendix S1 (Supporting
8 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 6
The Impact of the Election Outcome on Support for a Trade and Investment Agreement with the
United States
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
November
8/9
November
8/9
November
3–8/9–14
November
3–8/9–14 2014–2017 2014–2017
After 0.024 0.022 −0.007 −0.005 −0.003 0.004
(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Survey November 2014 0.051*** 0.055***
(0.010) (0.010)
Survey May 2015 0.031*** NA
(0.010)
Survey November 2015 −0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.010)
Survey May 2016 −0.024** NA
(0.009)
Survey May 2017 0.011 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Survey November 2017 0.032*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008)
Placebo after −0.006
(0.005)
Control variables Basic Extended Basic controls Extended Basic controls Basic controls
Observations 6,312 6,312 27,693 27,693 194,830 139,280
R2 0.1 0.196 0.084 0.166 0.08 0.076
The full table can be found in the Appendix S1. Coefficient estimates based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions,
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights to make the sample representative of the EU28 are used. The
dependent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the respondent is in favor of a trade and investment agreement with the United States.
“After,” is a dummy that is 1 for those interviewed after the elections (so after November 8, 2016). The basic set of controls
includes age, country dummies, educational level dummies, dummies for different professions, dummies reflecting how often
the respondent had difficulties paying bills last year, dummies for rural/urban and the gender of the respondent. The extended
specification adds dummies reflecting the respondents’ image of free trade, whether the respondent considers herself informed
about EU matters, whether the respondent considers herself politically left, center or right oriented, and whether the respondent
has trust in the legal system. The omitted base category represents female French respondents with less than 16 years of
education, not working, having difficulties paying bills most of the time, live in rural areas, tend to trust the legal system, feel
well informed about European matters, have a left wing political orientation and have a very positive view of free trade.
Columns I and II only use responses from 8 and 9 November, 2016. Columns III and IV use all respondents from November
2016. Column V uses all respondents interviewed between November 2014 and November 2017. Column VI uses the same
data as column V but excludes the data from May 2015 and May 2016 as no date of interview is available and the placebo
variable cannot be constructed for those surveys. The placebo variable is 1 for a wave’s respondents who were interviewed after
about 35% of respondents had been interviewed.
*p< .10, **p< .05; ***p< .01.
Information).11 The second set of control vari-
ables (columns II and IV) adds variables that
are more subjective, and could themselves be
potentially affected by the elections: dummies
reflecting the respondents’ image of free trade
in general, a dummy reflecting whether the
respondent considers him/herself informed about
EU policies, dummies reflecting whether the
respondent considers him/herself politically left,
center or right oriented, and a dummy reflecting
11. We show the results of OLS (with robust standard
errors) here as they are more straightforward to interpret. We
discuss logit and ordered probit results later in the robustness
checks section.
whether the respondent has trust in the legal
system.12
We also consider three periods: columns I
and II use only the data from November 8 and
12. The control variables in the first set are standard
control variables in the literature on trade policy preferences.
The second set of variables are all potentially relevant to the
decision regarding whether or not to support the agreement.
Respondents with a positive stance towards free trade in
general, with a right wing political orientation and with trust
in the legal system are likely to be more supportive of a
formal free trade agreement. Informed respondents are less
likely to be undecided. In the Appendix S1 (section A16), we
found the respondents’ views on free trade in general were
not significantly affected by the election outcome. The set of
subjective variables is not available in all survey years.
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November 9, 2016; column III to VI use data for
the period November 3 to November 14, 2016,
while column V and VI use data from all seven
Eurobarometer surveys between November 2014
and November 2017.
Focusing on the regressions which only use
the clearly exogenous control variables (columns
I and III), we find that once we control for back-
ground characteristics, we get an insignificant
impact of the election outcome: when we com-
pare November 8 to November 9 (column I),
we get a positive effect of about 2 percentage
points of extra support after the Trump election,
but when we compare the days before the elec-
tion to the days after the election (column III),
we get a negative effect of about 0.7 percentage
points less support after the election. Importantly,
neither effects are statistically significant at the
10% level.
Moreover, even a two percentage point posi-
tive effect on the probability of being in favor of
a trade and investment agreement with the United
States is small compared to some of the other,
significant, effects we found. For example, it is
somewhat smaller than the effect of being male
rather than female (+ about 5 percentage points)
and much smaller than the effect of never hav-
ing difficulties paying bills rather thanmost of the
time having such difficulties (+ about 10–12 per-
centage points).13 Noteworthy also are the large
differences in country fixed effects: for example,
compared to respondents in France (the base cat-
egory), respondents in Belgium and the Nether-
lands are, everything else equal, more than 10%
likelier to be in favor of a trade and investment
agreement with the United States, and respon-
dents in Scandinavia even more than 18% likelier
to be in favor. At the same time, respondents in
Austria (− about 20 percentage points) and Ger-
many (− about 10 percentage points) are much
less likely to be in favor of trade and investment
agreement with the United States.
Adding the more subjective variables, includ-
ing respondents’ overall view on free trade
(columns II and IV) leads to qualitatively similar
results and confirms the insignificant effect of
the election outcome. The subjective variables
all have expected signs and are quantitatively
important as they almost double the adjusted R2
of the regression. Respondents who have a very
positive image of free trade are more than 45
percentage points likelier to support a free trade
13. The table with all coefficient estimates is very long
and hence made available in the Appendix S1.
and investment agreement with the United States
than those having a very negative image of free
trade. Politically left-oriented respondents are
about 5 percentage points less likely to support
the agreement than right-oriented respondents;
those well informed about EU matters are about
6 percentage points more likely to support the
agreement than those not very well informed;
and those who trust the legal system are about
6 percentage points more likely to support
the agreement than those who do not trust the
legal system.
Columns V and VI include data not just from
November 2016 but from all Eurobarometer sur-
veys run between November 2014 and Novem-
ber 2017 which allows us to give an idea of how
the change in November 2016 compares to other
changes in support for the agreement with the
United States that have been observed over time.
In column V, we not only include our main
variable of interest—a dummy for all respon-
dents who answered the survey after the elec-
tion (those interviewed after November 8 in
the November 2016 survey but also those inter-
viewed in May and November 2017) and the set
of clearly exogenous control variables (such as
columns I and III), but also include separate dum-
mies for each survey wave except for the Novem-
ber 2016 survey.14 This allows us to compare the
(lack of) change in support for the agreement just
before and after the election, which we found in
column III, to the change between just before the
election in November 2016 (the base category)
and the other surveys. Column V thus reveals that
in November 2014, there were about 5 percent-
age points more support for the agreement than
in the pre-election period in November 2016, that
by May 2015, the difference had decreased to 3
percentage points, and that by November 2015,
there was no longer a difference. However, the
fall in support continued and 6 months before
the election (May 2016), there were 2 percentage
points less support for the agreement than in the
days before the November 2016 election. Con-
firming our earlier results, nothing much changed
in November 2016 and only by November 2017
the share of Europeans that support the agree-
ment with the United States is significantly big-
ger, about 3 percentage points, than the level of
support just before the elections.
14. Since we include a dummy for each survey wave
other than November 2016 and we have a dummy for after the
election, the base category becomes the pre-election period of
the November 2016 survey.
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Hence, while support for an agreement with
the United States increased in Europe after
Trump’s election, this increase had already
started before the election. Moreover, the level
of support did not change immediately after
the election. Instead the additional increase in
support mainly took place between May 2017
and November 2017. As a consequence, it is
not clear whether Trump’s election had a causal
positive effect on support for the agreement as
many things unrelated to Trump’s election also
changed between November 2016 and November
2017.15
Finally, column VI presents a placebo test.
So far, we have identified the election effect by
comparing the answers of 35% of the respon-
dents who were interviewed before the elections
in November 2016 to the 65% who were inter-
viewed after the elections. To separate a possible
election effect from the effect of being inter-
viewed later in a survey round, we created a
placebo dummy, including for the other surveys
implemented in theNovember 2014—November
2017 period, that takes the value of 1 for respon-
dents who were interviewed after about 35%
of the respondents of that round’s survey had
been interviewed. Column VI adds this placebo
dummy to the regression and shows the estimated
coefficients are basically zero and insignificant,
supporting our interpretation that nothing special
happened to support for the agreement in Novem-
ber 2016.16,17
Summarizing, once we control for other fac-
tors, we find not much evidence that the election
of Donald Trump had a meaningful and immedi-
ate negative effect on support of Europeans for
the trade and investment treaty with the United
States.18
15. For example, many European countries had national
elections in 2017.
16. We have fewer observations in column VI because
not all surveys included information about the date when
the interview took place and hence, we could not distinguish
between those interviewed early or late.
17. In the Appendix S1 (Section A 14) we also present
an analysis where we use ordered probit to regress a cate-
gorical dependent variable (the ordered categories being “not
supporting the agreement”, do not know, and “support the
agreement”) on the same variables as in Table 6. This leads
to similar conclusions as the OLS regressions.
18. This suggests that the positive evolution in support
we found in the descriptive statistics of Table 5 was mainly
due to differences in sample composition. In section VI, we
show there is considerable heterogeneity across countries in
the level of support for the agreement and in the evolution of
the support for the agreement, which is consistent with this.
So far, we have assumed that the Trump
election would negatively affect support for an
agreement with the United States because, given
that Europeans supported Clinton rather than
Trump, we assumed the image of the United
States in Europe had deteriorated. In the next
section, we check whether this assumption could
actually be incorrect.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTIONS ON
EUROPEANS’ VIEWS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES
There is many evidence that suggests the elec-
tion of Trump affected how people outside the
United States view the United States. First, many
observers believe that the election of Trump has
been bad for the country’s image abroad. The title
of a recent column in Foreign Policy by Lagon
and McKeon (2017), for example, reads “Donald
Trump Is Tarnishing America’s Brand.”
Second, there are several polls that point in
this direction. Pew Surveys, for example, indicate
that the approval rate of the US president outside
the United States dropped substantially between
2016 (when Obama was president) and 2017
(when Trump was president), as illustrated in
Table 7, columns I and III.
At the same time, the share of people who had
a favorable view of the United States decreased a
lot too (columns V and VII). Note moreover, that
the drop in the positive image of the United States
could be linked to the drop in popularity of the
president. Pew Research Center (2017) indeed
notes: “In countries where confidence in the U.S.
president fell most, America’s overall image has
also tended to suffer more. In the closing years
of the Obama presidency, a median of 64 percent
had a positive view of the U.S. Today, just 49
percent are favorably inclined toward America.”
In this paper, we can measure how Europeans
perceive the United States by using the following
question from the November Eurobarometer sur-
vey: “At the present time, would you say that, in
general, things are going in the right direction or
in the wrong direction, in the United States?” The
possible answers were: “right direction,” “wrong
direction,” “neither wrong nor right,” and “don’t
know.”19 The share of respondents indicating that
the United States was heading in a certain direc-
tion is shown in Table 8.
For the United States, when comparing
November 8 with November 9, we see a
19. The November 2016 survey was the first Eurobarom-
eter survey that included this question.
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TABLE 7
Approval Ratings of U.S. President and Views on the United States in Various Countries
Confidence
Obama 2016
Confidence
Trump 2017
Favorable View of
the United States
2016 (Obama)
Favorable View
of the United
States 2017 (Trump)
Yes Don’t Know Yes Don’t Know Yes Don’t Know Yes Don’t Know
Hungary 58 11 29 14 62 6 63 10
Poland 58 17 23 20 74 10 73 12
Italy 68 6 25 9 72 5 61 8
France 84 2 14 0 63 6 46 2
Sweden 93 0 10 0 69 3 46 3
Netherlands 92 1 17 2 63 8 37 4
Germany 86 1 11 2 57 5 35 3
United Kingdom 79 1 22 3 61 13 50 10
Greece 41 1 19 5 38 4 43 4
Spain 75 2 7 1 59 15 31 9
Based on http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/6/ and Pew Research Center (2017).
TABLE 8
Evolution of the Percentage of Respondents Who Think that the United States Is Heading in the
Right/Wrong Direction around the Election Date
November,
3–8, 2016
November 8,
2016
November 9,
2016
November 9–14,
2016
May
2017
November
2017
Right 17.69 18.29 13.14 16.51 15.34 16.28
Wrong 48.95 46.51 60.44 57.8 62.44 61.88
Neither right nor wrong 11.63 12.72 9.47 8.05 6.92 7.89
Don’t know 21.73 22.48 16.95 17.64 15.3 13.94
The numbers in the table are percentages. Survey weights to make the sample representative of the EU28 are used.
substantial increase of about 14 percentage
points in the share of respondents who think the
United States is heading in the wrong direction.
This increase comes from all the other categories:
there are about 5 percentage points fewer people
who think that the United States is moving in
the right direction, about 3 percentage points
fewer people who think that the United States
is moving neither in the wrong nor in the right
direction, and about 5 percentage points fewer
people who answered “don’t know.”
Rather than looking at the immediate reac-
tion, when we compare the days before the elec-
tion to the days after the election, we obtain a
smaller increase of about 9 percentage points
in the share of people who answered “going
in the wrong direction”, with the share of peo-
ple who answered “going in the right direction”
only dropped slightly (by about 1 percentage
point), but the share of people who stated “don’t
know” or neither direction dropped considerably,
by about 4 percentage points each.
The above table provides clear evidence that
the news about the Trump election had a negative
effect on how the United States was perceived in
Europe. The effect is sizeable (+9 to+14 percent-
age points) but not enormous (about a 20%–30%
increase relative to the 46% of respondents who
thought that the United States was heading in the
wrong direction just before the election).
To make sure this substantial negative shock is
not caused by the differences in the characteris-
tics of the respondents before and after the elec-
tions, which we discussed in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
Table 9 presents the results of a regression analy-
sis that is similar to Table 6 but in which we use
as dependent variable a dummy that is 1 if the
respondent thinks that the United States is head-
ing in the wrong direction and zero otherwise.
The regressions suggest that, even after con-
trolling for other factors, the share of respon-
dents who think that the United States is going
in the wrong direction in the days immediately
after the election is substantially larger than the
share immediately before the election, with point
estimates varying between +10 and +14 per-
centage points. In addition, columns V and VI
of Table 9 suggest that the increase in the share
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TABLE 9
The Impact of the Election Outcome on Respondents’ Opinion on the Direction the United States Is
Going
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
November
8/9
November
8/9
November
3–8/9–14
November
3–8/9–14 2014–2017 2014–2017
After 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.118*** 0.124***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Survey May 2017 0.034*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.008)
Survey November 2017 0.029*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.008)
Placebo after −0.007
(0.006)
Control variables Basic Extended Basic controls Extended Basic controls Basic controls
Observations 6,312 6,312 27,693 27,693 83,728 83,728
R2 0.099 0.135 0.075 0.118 0.118 0.118
The full table can be found in the Appendix S1. Coefficient estimates based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, with
robust standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights to make the sample representative of the EU28 are used. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is one if the respondent thinks the United States is going in the right direction. ‘After’, is a dummy
that is 1 for those interviewed after the elections (November 8, 2016). The basic set of controls includes age, country dummies,
educational level dummies, dummies for different professions, dummies reflecting how often the respondent had difficulties
paying bills last year, dummies for rural/urban and the gender of the respondent. The extended specification adds dummies
reflecting the respondents’ image of free trade, whether the respondent considers herself informed about EU matters, whether
the respondent considers herself politically left, center or right oriented, and whether the respondent has trust in the legal system.
The omitted base category represents female French respondents with less than 16 years of education, not working, having most
of the time difficulties paying bills, live in rural areas, tend to trust the legal system, feel well informed about European matters,
have a left wing political orientation and have a very positive view on free trade. Column I and II only use responses from
November 8 and 9, 2016. Column III and IV use all respondents from November 2016. Columns V and VI uses all respondents
interviewed between November 2016 and November 2017 (earlier surveys do not have the question on the direction the United
States is going). The placebo variable is 1 for a wave’s respondents who were interviewed after about 35% of respondents had
been interviewed.
*p< .10, **p< .05; ***p< .01.
of respondents, who thought the United States
is going in the wrong direction, continued to
increase by about 3% in 2017.
In summary, we find clear evidence that the
election of Trump had a considerable negative
impact on how Europeans perceived the United
States. Hence, our assumption that the Trump
election was bad for the perception of the United
States in Europe seems reasonable and we cannot
argue that we do not find a decrease in support
for the trade agreement because the election of
Trump just had no negative effect on the image
of the United States in Europe.20
20. A recent paper by Minkus, Deutschmann, and Del-
hey (2018), using a subset of the same Eurobarometer sur-
vey and a similar methodology to the one in column II, sug-
gests the Trump election had a small positive effect on the
view of Europeans on Europe, which they measure by a com-
posite of various statements about the EU. In the Appendix
S1 (section A15), we show that including the respondents’
view on the direction the EU is going, does not change our
main conclusions.
V. COUNTRY IMAGE AND TRADE PREFERENCES
To see the impact of country image, as proxied
by the perception EU respondents have of the
United States, and to investigate further to what
extent changes in country image can explain
changes in support for a trade and investment
agreement with the United States, we next
include the respondents’ answers regarding the
direction the United States is going as an addi-
tional explanatory variable to the regressions
that try to explain the share of European respon-
dents who are in favor of a trade and investment
agreement with the United States of Table 6.
Table 10 demonstrates that after including a
variable that proxies the reputation of the United
States, the estimates of the impact of the election
outcome increases slightly, by a couple of tenths
of a percentage points, but also that they generally
remain insignificant.21 Since Table 6 estimates
21. The exception is the regression in column I which
uses data from 8 and 9 November and only includes basic
controls. There we get a significant and positive effect.
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TABLE 10
The Impact of the Election Outcome on Support for a Trade and Investment Agreement with United
States
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
November
8/9
November
8/9
November
3–8/9–14
November
3–8/9–14 2014–2017 2014–2017
After 0.036* 0.029 −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.007
(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
United States: wrong direction −0.204*** −0.126*** −0.176*** −0.114*** −0.172*** −0.172***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
United States: Neither the one nor the other −0.128*** −0.067* −0.146*** −0.105*** −0.143*** −0.143***
(0.040) (0.037) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
United States: Don’t know −0.227*** −0.147*** −0.166*** −0.104*** −0.206*** −0.206***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Survey May 2017 0.012 0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Survey November 2017 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008)
Placebo After −0.004
(0.007)
Control Variables Basic
Controls
Extended
Controls
Basic
Controls
Extended
Controls
Basic
Controls
Basic
Controls
Observations 6,312 6,312 27,693 27,693 83,728 83,728
R2 0.122 0.205 0.1 0.172 0.091 0.091
The full table can be found in the Appendix S1. Estimates based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights to make the sample representative of EU28 are used. The dependent variable is
one if the respondent is in favor of a trade and investment agreement with the United States. ‘After’, is 1 for those interviewed
after the elections (November 8, 2016). The basic set of controls is age, country dummies, educational level dummies, dummies
for different professions, dummies reflecting financial situation, dummies for rural/urban and the gender of the respondent. The
extended specification adds dummies reflecting the respondents’ image of free trade, whether she considers herself informed
about EU matters, whether she considers herself politically left, center or right oriented, and whether she has trust in the legal
system. The omitted category is female and French, with less than 16 years of education, not working, having most of the time
difficulties paying bills, lives in rural areas, tends to trust the legal system, feels informed about European matters, has a left
wing political orientation and has a very positive view on free trade. Column I and II only use responses from November 8 and 9,
2016. Column III and IV uses all responses from November 2016. Columns V and VI uses all respondents interviewed between
November 2016 and November 2017 (earlier surveys do not have the question on the direction the United States is going). The
placebo variable is 1 for a wave’s respondents who were interviewed after about 35% of respondents had been interviewed.
Including image, weighted.
*p< .10, **p< .05; ***p< .01.
give the overall effect, and Table 10 give the over-
all effect without the image effect, the fact that
the later are slightly higher than the former sug-
gest the overall image effect could have been
slightly negative. Table 10 also suggests why this
was the case: thinking the United States is going
in the wrong direction is associated with a drop
in the chance a respondent would support the
agreement by about 10–20 percentage points, as
compared to a respondent who thinks the United
States is going in the right direction. Hence, a 10
percentage point switch in people thinking the
United States is going in the right direction to
thinking it is going in the wrong direction would
be associated with a decrease in support for the
agreement by about 1–2 percentage points. In
the case of the Trump election, however, Table 8
suggests that the biggest part of the increase
in the share of respondents who think that the
United States is going in the wrong direction does
not come from people switching from the “right
direction” category, but rather comes from people
switching from the “don’t know” category and
the “Neither right or wrong” category. Table 10
illustrates that the negative impact of these cat-
egories, compared to thinking the United States
is going in the right direction, is similar to the
negative impact of thinking the United States is
going in the wrong direction. Combined, these
two effects explain why the reputational cost in
terms of support in Europe for a trade and invest-
ment agreement was so limited.
VI. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF THE
ELECTION OUTCOME
In our analysis so far, we used weighted data.
That is, our descriptive statistics and regressions
used surveys weights to make the sample rep-
resentative of the population of the European
Union. We also interpreted our results in terms of
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how the election outcome changed public opinion
in Europe.
The Eurobarometer survey interviews about
1,000 people in each of the 28 member states.
Simply pooling these data into a sample of about
28,000 respondents does not lead to a sample
representative of the population of the European
Union. For example, while both France and Bel-
gium have about the same number of observa-
tions in the sample, France’s population is about
six times bigger than Belgium’s population (66
vs. 11 million). Hence to get a sample that is rep-
resentative for the EU, each French observation is
given the weight of (on average) 3.4 observations,
which is about 6 times bigger than the weight of
(on average) 0.6 given to a Belgian observation.22
When using weighted data, we found that
the election outcome did not have an immedi-
ate effect on support for the agreement with the
United States in the European Union. However,
when we simply pool the data for the 28 dif-
ferent countries, do not apply weights, and then
run the regressions of Table 6 (which explain
the share of respondents who support the agree-
ment) we consistently get a significant positive
estimate.23 Those unweighted regressions sug-
gest that, immediately after the election, there
was an increase of about 2 percentage points in
support for the trade and investment agreement
with the United States., This difference between
the weighted and unweighted estimates suggests
the impact of the election outcome could be het-
erogeneous, in which case neither the weighted
nor the unweighted estimates are necessarily the
correct estimates of the population average effect
(see Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015).
That the weighted regressions have a smaller
estimated impact of the election outcome than the
unweighted regressions suggest that the impact
of the election outcome is smaller for bigger
countries (which have a relatively big weight in
the weighted regressions) than it is for smaller
22. The weights we use (w23 in the survey) combine
both the population size weighting and the in-country
post stratification weighting (w1 in the survey), the latter
making country data representative in terms of certain
socio-demographic characteristics of the country (see https://
www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/
standard-special-eb/weighting-overview for details). Using
only the post-stratification weights gives results similar to
the unweighted data which suggests it is the population size
weighting that drives the difference.
23. A table, like Table 6, but with unweighted regression
results and a table with country level descriptive statistics (like
Table 5) can be found in the Appendix S1 (sections A2, A4
and A5).
countries (which have a relatively bigger weight
in the unweighted regressions). To check this, we
analyze the data for each country separately.24
Country level regressions in Table 11 (using
the specification of column V of Tables 6 and 10)
confirm there is indeed substantial heterogeneity
in the estimated impact of the election on sup-
port for the treaty: column I shows that 13 coun-
tries have an immediate negative impact, but only
three of these are significantly negative (column
II gives the t values). Fifteen countries have a pos-
itive impact, five of which are significant and, on
average, the positive estimates are indeed bigger
in absolute value than the negative estimates.25
When also taking into account columns III
and V which show the changes by May 2017
and November 2017, we can see that even more
countries (18) see an increase in support between
November 2016 and May 2017. Especially in the
bigger countries does the increase in support start
later than November 2016: only Spain increased
support immediately after the day of the elec-
tion. Germany and Poland increased their support
only by May 2017, France and Italy changed lit-
tle over the whole period and the United King-
dom decreased support initially but later recov-
ered. Smaller countries were likelier to increase
support immediately after the day of the elec-
tion, but this initial increase was often followed
by a decrease in support between November 2016
and May 2017. Portugal and Bulgaria, two of
the five countries with an immediate significant
positive impact, return to their pre-election level
of support by the May 2017 survey.26 Hence,
while there is some evidence of an immediate
(and thus causal) positive Trump effect for some
smaller European countries, it is unclear whether
the more general gradual increase in support
for the agreement with the United States which
we observe in Europe between 2016 and 2017
24. Given we have about 1,000 observations for each
country, we do not have enough observations to do a country-
level analysis that only uses data for November 8 and Novem-
ber 9, and hence focus on the comparison of the days before
(November 3–8) and after (November 9–14) the election.
25. Columns VII to XII mimics Table 10 and includes
dummies for respondents’ views on the direction the United
States is going in. Results are similar to those discussed in
the text.
26. Nine of the 15 countries that increased support
immediately after the election, decreased support between
November 2016 and May 2017. The correlation between
the initial change (from before the election to after the
election in November 2016) and the subsequent change
(between after the election in November 2016 and May 2017)
is −0.7.
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TABLE 11
Evolution of the Percentage of Respondents Who Support the Agreement with the United States—By
Country
Nov
2016
Basic t-Statics
May
2017
Basic t-Statics
November
2017
Basic t-Statics
November
2016
Extension t-Statics
May
2017
Extension t-Statics
November
2017
Extension t-Statics
France −.009 −.26 −.0142 −.5 −.02 −.6 −.004 −.13 −.0102 −.36 −.02 −.55
Belgium .043 1.13 .0527 1.93 .07 2.47 .046 1.24 .0507 1.86 .07 2.58
Netherlands .085 2.42 −.0354 −1.26 −.03 −.94 .095 2.75 −.028 −1 −.02 −.6
Germany −.027 −.95 .0711 2.8 .1 4.08 −.016 −.56 .077 3.03 .11 4.27
Italy .007 .2 .0043 .16 .01 .19 .016 .48 .0038 .14 0 .1
Luxembourg −.003 −.06 .0694 1.66 0 .1 .007 .14 .0689 1.64 .01 .19
Denmark .077 2.01 −.0092 −.33 −.05 −1.68 .071 1.86 −.0063 −.23 −.05 −1.61
Ireland −.015 −.41 .0018 .09 .01 .64 −.013 −.36 0 0 .01 .37
Great Britain −.059 −1.8 .0004 .02 .04 1.74 −.071 −2.15 −.0049 −.22 .04 1.57
Greece −.044 −1.34 .0517 1.91 .1 3.6 −.031 −.94 .0427 1.57 .09 3.21
Spain .063 1.52 −.0358 −1.38 .04 1.59 .076 1.86 −.0298 −1.17 .03 1.32
Portugal .093 2.86 −.1051 −4.75 −.13 −5.99 .104 3.27 −.0975 −4.31 −.12 −5.4
Finland .047 1.32 −.0522 −1.91 −.08 −2.85 .049 1.39 −.0476 −1.73 −.07 −2.62
Sweden .065 1.5 −.0186 −.62 −.04 −1.29 .046 1.06 −.0214 −.71 −.04 −1.36
Austria −.069 −2.34 .0547 2.38 .07 3.04 −.063 −2.15 .0627 2.75 .08 3.42
Cyprus .034 .73 .0153 .38 −.04 −.9 .04 .88 .0239 .6 −.03 −.81
Czech Republic .015 .41 −.0513 −2 −.01 −.55 .007 .19 −.044 −1.74 −.01 −.6
Estonia .059 1.68 .0257 .96 −.02 −.71 .051 1.46 .0316 1.19 −.01 −.29
Hungary −.003 −.08 .0228 .92 .07 2.9 −.012 −.32 .0114 .48 .05 2.05
Latvia −.039 −1.14 .0512 2.07 0 .03 −.033 −.98 .0564 2.28 .01 .28
Lithuania −.014 −.48 .0283 1.21 .02 .77 −.005 −.18 .014 .6 0 .01
Malta .066 1.47 −.0694 −1.9 −.08 −2.2 .069 1.58 −.0723 −1.98 −.09 −2.62
Poland −.043 −1.29 .0565 2.18 .09 3.71 −.042 −1.25 .0537 2.09 .08 3.34
Slovakia −.047 −1.03 .0572 2.32 0 .01 −.026 −.6 .062 2.58 0 .1
Slovenia .025 .7 .0246 .93 .04 1.6 .003 .09 .0486 1.85 .07 2.65
Bulgaria .144 4.73 −.1115 −4.03 −.04 −1.55 .152 4.98 −.1075 −3.85 −.05 −1.73
Romania −.127 −2.79 .0337 1.54 .01 .52 −.09 −1.98 .0262 1.21 .01 .58
Croatia .04 1.14 .0374 1.5 −.09 −3.73 .033 .94 .0345 1.41 −.1 −4.13
Country regressions with specifications like column V in Table 6 for columns I–VI and column V in Table 11 (columns VII–XII). Bold is
significant at 10%.
in Europe is causally related to Trump’s presi-
dency.27
That some people increased their support for
the agreement after their image of United States
(president) decreased, seems counterintuitive,
though a number of possible explanations can be
offered. A first possible explanation comes from
the literature on formal and informal institutions.
Informal institutions often act as a substitute for
formal institutions. There is evidence of such
substitutability in the trade literature. In the
eleventh century, for example, Mediterranean
trade was facilitated by a coalition of traders who
conducted their trade with other coalition mem-
bers who had good reputations, while avoiding
traders with bad reputations (see Greif 1993).
Even today, countries with poor formal institu-
tions use reputation as a mechanism of contract
enforcement similar to the early traders (see, e.g,.
27. While the main change between November 3–8,
2016 and November 9–14, 2016 is the election outcome,
many things that can affect trade policy preferences have
changed between November 2016 and November 2017.
Hence, for this longer period, we have much less support for
a causal interpretation.
Bigsten et al. 2000 or Yu, Beugelsdijk, and de
Haan 2015). Hence, the increased support for the
agreement is consistent with some EU respon-
dents being happy with an informal agreement
on trade with an Obama-like administration;
but this is no longer the case for a Trump-led
administration. This could be especially relevant
for the smaller countries which have more to fear
and lose because of Trump’s lack of interest in
free trade institutions like the WTO.
An alternative explanation could be that those
not liking Trump decided to support the agree-
ment with the United States because Trump had
expressed his opposition to this agreement.
Note that a country level regression analysis
of respondent’s opinion about whether the United
States is going in the wrong direction (Table 12,
like column V in Table 9), however, shows a
much clearer picture, with 24 (out of 28)countries
showing an immediate increase in the share of
respondents who think the United States is going
in the wrong direction in November 2016 (16
of which are significantly positive) and then for
many, the image of the United States continues
to decline throughout 2017.
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TABLE 12
Evolution of the Percentage of Respondents Who Think the United States Is Going in the Wrong
Direction—By Country
November 2016
Basic t-Statics
May 2017
Basic t-Statics
November 2017
Basic t-Statics
France .13 4.06 .0348 1.36 .1 3.88
Belgium .029 .87 .0673 2.87 .1 4.41
Netherlands .109 3.21 .111 4.55 .12 4.77
Germany .14 4.83 .146 6.35 .15 6.75
Italy .01 .3 .0137 .49 0 −.13
Luxembourg .136 2.78 .02 .51 .08 2.12
Denmark .046 1.31 .0478 1.82 .12 4.48
Ireland .005 .12 .0987 4.22 .04 1.63
Great Britain .086 2.39 .0279 1.25 0 .18
Greece .092 2.83 −.1046 −3.93 −.09 −3.34
Spain .21 5.3 .0224 .84 −.02 −.69
Portugal .088 2.82 .2387 10.35 .23 9.9
Finland .062 1.76 .0916 3.49 .11 4.21
Sweden .182 4.18 .0435 1.66 .1 3.84
Austria .078 2.33 .0418 1.62 .04 1.47
Cyprus .036 .77 .0951 2.25 .11 2.72
Czech Republic −.052 −1.42 .004 .15 −.05 −1.83
Estonia .039 1.11 .0094 .33 .05 1.58
Hungary −.111 −2.95 −.0081 −.34 −.06 −2.38
Latvia .029 .9 −.0066 −.27 .05 1.92
Lithuania .162 4.61 −.0854 −2.97 −.13 −4.36
Malta −.02 −.4 .0286 .69 .12 2.83
Poland .141 4.44 −.0767 −2.93 −.12 −4.55
Slovakia .104 2.31 .0174 .7 .03 1.34
Slovenia −.101 −2.84 .1261 4.81 .16 6.28
Bulgaria .047 1.66 .0435 1.61 0 −.02
Romania .198 4.54 −.0566 −2.44 −.06 −2.55
Croatia .006 .17 −.0514 −2.05 −.09 −3.46
Country regressions with specifications like column V in Table 10. Column I gives the difference between November 3–8,
2016 and November 9–14, 2016. Column III gives the difference between November 9–14, 2016 and May 2017. Column V
gives the difference between November 9–14, 2016 and November 2017.
Summarizing, we get sizeable and immedi-
ate reputation effects when we analyze coun-
tries separately and when we weigh observations
so as to represent the European Union. When
we analyze support for the trade and investment
agreement, however, we find little evidence of
a decrease in support, both at the country level
and when weighing the sample so as to represent
the European Union. Instead, we find support for
an immediate increase in support for the agree-
ment in some smaller European countries, fol-
lowed by a gradual increase in a bigger number
of countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Using quasi-experimental data, a survey that
was conducted immediately before and after
the 2016 United States election, we analyze
the impact of the unexpected victory of Don-
ald Trump on trade partner preferences of the
Europeans. We showed that this unexpected
election outcome did not decrease the probability
that a survey respondent in Europe would support
a free trade and investment agreement with the
United States.
This is surprising given that most Europeans
did prefer not to have Trump as president, which
is confirmed by the data also revealing a sizeable
negative effect of the election on the image of
the United States in Europe, as measured by the
expectation of EU citizens about the direction in
which the United States was going. Immediately
after the election, the probability that a European
respondent would view theUnited States as going
in the wrong direction increased by about 10
percentage points.
We do find that country image matters, but
that in the case of the Trump election the size of
this effect was very limited because the election
mainly caused undecided people to adjust their
image of the United States in a negative way,
rather than turn people with a positive image
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into people with a negative image of the United
States. Given people with a positive image are
most likely to support the trade agreement, little
changed overall.
Our results thus provide mixed support for
the literature on “treaty partner heuristics” which
argues that when people are asked whether they
support a trade agreement with a particular part-
ner, they rely on their general feelings toward that
potential trade partner. On the one hand, we find
that the election of Donald Trump, which led to a
sizeable increase in negative feelings toward the
United States, did not lead to a sizeable decrease
in support for a trade and investment agreement
with the United States. On the other hand, we
do find evidence that image matters, but that the
election shock mainly worsened the perception
of those who had not been convinced about the
agreement yet.
The results also provide insights for those
wanting to increase public support for a trade
agreement with a specific country by improving
the image of that country. First, the impact of
image is fairly limited. Second, people who are
indifferent about a potential trade partner country
will not be supportive of the agreement. Hence, to
get a meaningful increase in support, one needs to
be able to convince a large part of the population
to have a positive view about the potential trade
partner country.
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